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During the first quarter of 2004, the General Secretariat of the Commission bancaire (SGCB) and the
Directorate General Economics and International Relations (DGEI) of the Banque de France conducted
an assessment of the stability of the French banking system and its capacity to withstand a set of
macroeconomic and financial shocks, as part of a broader evaluation of the French financial system
carried out under the auspices of the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The assessment
employed a macro-prudential approach which seeks to quantify the effects of shocks to the banking
system using “stress tests”. The tests measured the impact of severe shocks, deemed  plausible but
infrequent: e.g., a recession, a large movement in interest rates, an oil price shock, a sharp drop in stock
prices.
This report discusses in detail the principal characteristics of the “stress tests” and the innovations introduced
during the French FSAP, including in particular the design of coherent scenarios, which were developed
using the DGEI’s macroeconomic model and the SGCB’s financial models for measuring risk.
The results of the assessment indicate that, given the high average solvency ratio, the French banking
system is currently in a position to withstand a major macroeconomic shock, such as a prolonged recession
lasting two years. This type of shock would, however, erode the quality of bank assets and reduce bank
profits by 38.5% in the second year, compared with the baseline, resulting in a decline in the international
solvency ratio of one percentage point (using the Basel I methodology) or two percentage points (using
the new methodology proposed in the Basel II Accord). Other scenarios, such as a 32% depreciation of
the dollar against the euro for two years or an increase of nearly 50% in the price of oil also for two years,
would have more limited effects on net income and solvency ratios.
The authors wish to thank Henri Fraisse (Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasts Division) and Sophie Garcia (Foreign Economies Research Division)
for carrying out the simulations of macroeconomic shocks using the Banque de France’s Mascotte model and the National Institute of Economic and
Social Research’s (NIESR’s) NiGEM model.56 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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I
n the first quarter of 2004, the General Secretariat
of the Commission bancaire (SGCB) and the
Directorate General Economics and International
Relations (DGEI) of the Banque de France undertook
an examination of the stability of the French banking
system and its capacity to withstand a set of
macroeconomic and financial shocks. This study was
conducted in conjunction with the IMF as part of a
broader assessment of financial systems, known as
the FSAP (Financial Sector Assessment Program).
The first section of this report places this study of
the effect of rare but plausible shocks (“stress tests”)
in the more general context of the “macro-prudential”
approach, which is applied in an increasing number
of countries. The second section describes the
principal characteristics of the “stress tests” and the
innovations introduced in the course of the French
assessment. The third section presents the results of
the assessment. The concluding section draws some
lessons from the exercise.
1| “STRESS TESTS”
Since the mid–1990s, central banks and the
authorities responsible for bank supervision have
placed increasing emphasis on the macro-prudential
perspective: the study of linkages between
macroeconomic trends and the stability of the
financial system, and the banking system in
particular. “Stress tests” constitute an important
element of this approach.
1|1 Issues of macro-prudential policy
Recent financial crises have highlighted the
importance of macroeconomic analysis of the
banking sector and its interactions with financial
stability, which goes beyond the supervision of
individual financial institutions by supervisory
authorities and the macroeconomic analysis
performed by central banks as part of the
implementation of monetary policy.
Chart 1
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1 These empirical studies confirm the conclusions of economic theory, which for a long time has emphasised the link between macroeconomic trends and
the stability of the banking system. See Gorton (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), using the original model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
In Chen's model (1999), an unfavourable macroeconomic shock increases the risk of banking contagion. See also de Bandt and Hartmann (2002).
AN INCREASINGLY PRESSING NEED
The financial crises of the past decade illustrate the
prominent role of macroeconomic factors in
triggering crises. A variety of mechanisms can be
involved, but the causal chain is usually simple: over
indebtedness of households and businesses in the
wake of the rapid growth in bank lending leading to
a series of bankruptcies in the industrial sector,
exacerbated by deterioration in the terms of trade
and a drop in exports, leading in turn to an increase
in the volume of loan losses and failures of banking
institutions.
The Asian crisis of 1997 also showed the decisive
role of deterioration in macroeconomic
fundamentals in triggering crises. This conclusion
has been documented in the work of Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999), using data covering a large number
of emerging countries and also some developed
countries. Since the 1980s, a large number of
banking crises have been associated with currency
crises (the peak of the banking crisis generally
coming after the currency crisis). Both types of crises
are generally preceded by a recession, or at least a
period of economic growth below potential growth.1
Chart 1 shows the rate of growth in gross domestic
product and the ratio of provisions for loan losses
to the outstanding amount of bank loans for several
countries. The charts illustrate the link between
economic growth and the health of the banking
system. The 1991 recessions in the United States
and the United Kingdom, as well as the 1993
recessions in France, Germany and Italy, led to an
erosion in the quality of portfolios and a significant
increase in provisioning. Provisions were generally
reduced during the rising phase of the economic
cycle at the end of the 1990s, only to increase again
at the beginning of the 2000s, although to a more
limited extent than before.
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2 See IMF (2000)
VARIETY OF METHODS
Because of the great number of mechanisms via
which macroeconomic developments influence the
stability of the banking system, several types of tools
are used to implement a macro-prudential approach,
for which there is not currently a single definition.
According to C. Borio (2003), the ultimate goal of the
macro-prudential approach is to study the risk of a
general breakdown of the financial system, and not
simply the risk of failure of individual institutions.
Hence the emphasis is placed on the risk of contagion
and on shared exposure to macroeconomic shocks,
rather than on factors specific to particular financial
institutions. By monitoring relevant macroeconomic
indicators and developing leading indicators of
banking crises (“early warning systems”), it is possible
to assess the probability that the financial system
will be affected by unfavourable financial or
macroeconomic shocks. “Stress tests” measure the
effects of such shocks on the stability of the banking
system. In FSAP missions, this analysis is often
complemented by an assessment of the risk of
contagion in financial systems, which are increasingly
interdependent (analysis of exposures).
Monitoring relevant macroeconomic indicators
At both national and multilateral levels (IMF),
certain quantitative indicators are closely monitored
by the authorities responsible for financial stability.
These include both microeconomic aggregates
relating to asset quality, profitability, sensitivity
to market risks, and capital standards; and
macroeconomic indicators: economic growth and
the volatility of inflation rates, interest rates, and
exchange rates.2 These indicators have been selected
by virtue of their influence on the level of loan
losses, earnings, and bank capital. For a given
country, a subset of these indicators can be the object
of “stress tests”. The macro-prudential indicators
make it possible to determine the relevance of the
“stress” scenarios at a given moment in time.
Leading indicators
More specifically, macro-prudential indicators can
be used as forecasting tools, to predict the likelihood
of future banking crises. The choice of leading
indicators of banking crises has been the subject of
extensive research. However, the analysis by Berg,
Borensztein and Patillo (2004) of different
econometric models  indicates that their actual
performance in terms of forecasting has been
disappointing. It thus appears difficult, for the time
being, to focus only on a small number of indicators
to predict banking crises.
Analysing the risk of contagion
A final dimension is often reserved for the most
developed countries, whose banking and financial
systems are the most sophisticated. The analysis of
the risk of contagion is an essential component of
the supervision of financial conglomerates. In the
French FSAP, only bank-insurance combinations
were considered relevant as far as the possible risk
of contagion is concerned. But this risk turns out to
be of limited magnitude (see below). However, if
the risk of contagion is large, the “top down”
approach favoured by the macro-prudential
perspective (i.e. the stability of the financial system
taken as a whole) can produce results that are
different from those produced by the “bottom-up”
approach, i.e. the financial stability of individual
institutions (see below).
1|2 Growing use of “stress tests”
To date, more than ninety “stress test” exercises have
been completed by the IMF or are on the way to
being completed. Initially conceived for emerging
countries, where they have been used in nearly
three-quarters of the exercises already completed
or in the process of completion, “stress tests” are
now increasingly used by developed countries.
Following Japan in 2001, the United Kingdom in
2002, and Germany in 2003, France is now the fourth
major G10 country to use these large-scale
simulations to assess the soundness of its banking
and financial systems. This trend should become
more pronounced in the future, due in part to the
incorporation of “stress tests” in the new Basel II
Accord governing capital standards for banking
institutions.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 59
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2| CHARACTERISTICS
OF FRENCH “STRESS TESTS”
Several types of innovation were introduced in the
course of the French “stress tests”:
• to begin with, as indicated above, the IMF chose
for the first time, because of the importance of
bancassurance in France, to analyze the impact of
certain scenarios on banks and insurance
subsidiaries together. Information on the effects on
insurance subsidiaries was provided by the French
Insurance Commission (Commission de contrôle des
assurances), which was responsible for conducting
the FSAP in this sector;
• in addition, several quantitative tools for assessing
the sensitivity of bank exposures to macroeconomic
developments were employed;
• to ensure consistency between the simulations
carried out by the SGCB and those carried out by
banks, the macroeconomic “stress” scenarios were
illustrated with key parameters drawn from the
Mascotte macroeconomic model of the Banque de
France, such as the rate of growth in bank loans,
and provided to credit institutions;
• furthermore, the macroeconomic “stress” scenarios
were implemented using both the Mascotte model
(for France) and the NiGEM model (to take into
account the effect of international shocks);
• finally, the effect of the shocks on solvency ratios
was calculated using the methodologies of Basel I
and Basel II.
Major market institutions participated actively in
these simulations. Along with the simulations
carried out by supervisors, “stress tests” were
conducted independently by the seven largest
banking groups in terms of share of the French
banking system (representing more than 60% of the
net banking income of the French banking system
and 80% of total assets in 2003).
2|1 Testing strategies
DYNAMIC VERSUS STATIC SCENARIOS
The strategy chosen to carry out the FSAP
simulations was sensitivity analysis. This is the
simplest approach to operationalise, given the
current state of the art, and is generally used in the
majority of the large developed countries which have
already carried out this exercise. In agreement with
the IMF, the “feedback” effect on the real economy
of an initial shock affecting the banking and financial
system was not considered. In addition, there was
no detailed analysis of systemic risk in the narrow
sense of the term, i.e. the propagation of shocks
between individual institutions. The emphasis is
instead on market shocks and exposure to
macroeconomic shocks.
The sensitivity analysis comprises a static analysis
and a dynamic analysis.
The static sensitivity analysis focuses on the
instantaneous impact of shocks to monetary and
financial markets, including foreign exchange
markets. These shocks are large in magnitude but
limited in time, and their impact is transmitted
through instruments quoted in various markets
(interest rate, exchange rate, stock market index,
etc.). The calibration of these instantaneous shocks
generally corresponds to the 99th percentile of the
historical probability distributions observed over the
past thirty years. These shocks are mainly univariate
(single-factor), although multivariate scenarios
combining several factors have also been carried out.
They produce a price effect on banks’ portfolios,
which is evaluated instantaneously. Also included
in this category are certain shocks of a “systemic”
nature affecting credit risk (such as a sudden flight
to liquidity), or sectoral shocks: for example,
deterioration in credit spreads in the TMT
(Technology Media-Telecommunications) sector.
There are two principal reasons for carrying out a
more dynamic analysis of the impact of “stress”
events.60 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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3 See Baghli et al. (2003 et 2004)
4 Downward shocks to property prices were not considered explicitly, due to the absence of wealth effects on consumption in the current version of
the Mascotte macroeconomic model. This type of risk was nevertheless taken into account indirectly by means of sectoral shocks to credit risk.
5 Priority was given to the stability of the French financial system, and thus the macroeconomic scenarios measure the impact of shocks on the
French economy. International shocks can, in principle, partly be transmitted via the international activities of French banking groups. However,
the impact of shocks on macroeconomic trends in other countries was not studied in detail.
• The first stems from the fact that credit risk is
still the principal risk borne by banks. Since the
credit cycle is relatively long and closely linked to
the economic cycle, the overall effect of the “stress”
event is poorly captured by a static analysis, which
focuses on very short term effects.
• The second relates to the weak economic
credibility of factor scenarios, in which a shock is
assumed to affect only a single economic or financial
variable, with other variables remaining fixed; or
possibly several variables but with arbitrary
assumptions concerning their possible correlation.
This explains why this type of scenario is generally
credible only for instantaneous shocks.
In contrast, dynamic sensitivity analysis is global
and macroeconomic in character. It considers a
scenario in which an exogenous shock to the French
economy is propagated over time, impacting the
banking system through two mechanisms: an
increase in risk and an income effect stemming
from a possible contraction in economic activity.
This type of scenario requires the use of a
macroeconomic model; the French FSAP utilised  the
Mascotte model to simulate the impact of several
macroeconomic shocks.3 It was employed in
conjunction with the NiGEM model in order to take
into account the impact on France’s international
environment of shocks of a “global” nature.
SIMULATION HORIZON OF DYNAMIC SCENARIOS
The simulation horizon used in these scenarios is
two years. This corresponds to an estimate of the
average maturity of bank portfolios and represents
the maximum period of time for which the
assumption that banks do not restructure their
portfolios is acceptable.
The scenarios of macroeconomic “stress” were
constructed in two stages. The “baseline”
corresponds to the OECD’s forecast for 2004 and 2005
issued in the autumn of 2003 (OECD Economic
Outlook): estimated French GDP growth of 1.7%
in 2004 and 2.5% in 2005. The macroeconomic
“stress” scenarios are then simulated using various
exogenous shocks specified by the IMF (Box 1).4
For each “stress” scenario, measurements were made
of the effect of the shock on a set of macroeconomic
variables: GDP and its components, loans extended
to businesses and households, and corporate failures.
The variants obtained were distributed to the banks
participating in the exercise (the “bottom-up”
approach – see below) and were also used in the
“top-down” approach conducted by supervisors.
In addition to providing these variants to the banks,
they were given the option of developing alternative
variants using their own internal economic models.
Only one bank took advantage of this option.
2|2 Consistency of “top-down”
and “bottom-up” approaches
REFERENCE SCENARIOS
In the so-called “bottom-up” approach, each bank
was asked to simulate the reference scenarios and
to measure the impact on the variables of interest
(listed below) on the basis of its consolidated
accounts.5 For its part, the SGCB conducted a
“top-down” approach, incorporating the results of the
shocks on the macroeconomic variants in its own
financial models.
VARIABLES OF INTEREST
The results of the “stress tests” were measured in
terms of three different indicators, which constitute
the presumed variables of interest for the banking
system. These are also the variables used in the
macro-prudential approach described in the first
section of this article, namely:
• profitability;
• exposures;
• and capital, i.e. the solvency ratio.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 61
ARTICLES
Assessment of “stress tests” conducted on the French banking system
ARTICLES
Box 1
Reference scenarios
Single- and multi-factor shocks (frequency of occurrence: 1% over the past 30 years)
F1 Flattening of the yield curve due to an increase in interest rates: increase of 150 basis points (bp) in overnight rates,
increase of 50 bp in 10-year rates, with interpolation for intermediate maturities.
F2 Steepening of the yield curve due to a decrease in interest rates: decrease of 50 bp in overnight rates; no change in
10-year rates, and interpolation for intermediate maturities.
F3 Parallel shift upwards of 300 basis points of the entire yield curve. “Stress” limited to the insurance sector.
F4 General deterioration in counterparty credit quality: downgrade by one “notch” on the Standard and Poor’s reference
scale in the quality of all counterparties; downgrade by two notches on the same scale in the quality of counterparties
in specific sectors: energy, transport, telecommunications and commercial property.
F5 Share price decline of 30% in all stock markets.
F6a and F6b  Appreciation/depreciation of 15% in the euro relative to major currencies (USD, JPY).
F7 Downgrade by two notches in the credit quality of emerging-country counterparties for exposures representing 50%
of all emerging-country exposures.
F8 Increase of 30% in volatility in all markets: interest rate, exchange rate, financial markets, etc.
F9 Flattening of the yield curve (increase of 150 basis points in overnight rates, increase of 50 bp in10-year rates)
together with a 30% drop in stock markets.
Macroeconomic scenarios (the probability of occurrence of the shock during the period 1978-2003 – quarterly
data – is shown in parentheses)
M1 (1%) Twenty-per-cent decline in global demand for two years: simulation of a sharp contraction in global demand
resulting in a reduction in outlets for domestic production destined for export markets. This leads to a sharp decline
in economic activity in France: zero growth in 2004 and 2005 (decline in personal consumption and investment)
combined with a deficit in the balance of trade (contraction in exports), with the consequence for banks of a decline
in lending to households and businesses coupled with an increase in failures.
M2 (1%) Increase to USD 40 in the price per barrel of Brent crude for two years (an increase of 48% compared with
USD 27 per barrel in the baseline case), without any reaction from the central bank; the increase in the price of oil
leads to an increase in the general rate of inflation and a decline in economic activity in France together with a drop
in global demand.
M3 (<1%) Increase to USD 40 in the price per barrel of Brent crude for two years, with a reaction from the central bank.
This scenario repeats the assumptions of the previous scenario, accompanied by a reaction of the central bank as
postulated in the NiGEM model (increase in key interest rates to try to reduce inflationary pressures and counter
“second-round” effects on wages). While such a rate increase has the potential to further slow French economic
activity, worsening the scenario in the short term, it permits a steepening of the yield curve which is favourable to
banks.
M4 (5%) Depreciation of the dollar against European currencies (euro, Swiss franc, Pound sterling, etc.) averaging 32%
for two years. This scenario leads to a decline in the competitiveness of the euro area, and of France in particular,
leading to reduced growth in France and in the euro area.62 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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For each of the variables of interest, the results of
the “stress” simulations were expressed in terms of
the cumulative change in net income on the one
hand, and capital and solvency ratios on the other
hand, at the specified time horizon (instantaneous
for single-factor and multi-factor shocks and one to
two years for macroeconomic shocks). These effects
were felt via changes in loan losses and net
provisions for credit shocks.
For the macroeconomic scenarios projected over
a two-year horizon, the effect on net income took
account of a tax depreciation of 33%, corresponding
to the deductibility of losses from the corporate
tax base.
SYNTHETIC MEASURE OF IMPACT
The different measures of impact produced by the
simulations were summarised and compared in
terms of their overall impact on the solvency ratio,
with a distinction being made between Basel I
(Cooke ratio) and Basel II definitions. While profits
generally appear to be the first cushion for absorbing
the losses generated by unfavourable situations, they
can be insufficient to cover unexpected losses in
“stress” situations. In this case, the mobilisation of
capital is necessary.
Thus the solvency ratio CARt = Kt / RWAt relates
capital Kt to risk-weighted assets RWAt. The
numerator of the ratio includes the change in net
earnings due to the “stress” scenario. In the Basel I
simulations, the denominator (RWAt) takes into
account only the variation in capital requirements
due to the volume effect, while in the Basel II
simulations it takes into account both the volume
effect and the deterioration in assets. Thus, in the
latter approach both the numerator and denominator
of the solvency ratio are affected.
The choice of a Basel II measure of the solvency
ratio appears logical. In the first place, it anticipates
the adoption of the new solvency standards,
particularly under the heading of Pillar 2 of Basel II,
which calls on supervisors to incorporate measures
of “stress” in their capital requirements. In the
second place, the Basel II measure does not limit
the impact of a “stress”  –in particular, a
macroeconomic “stress” – to likely failures, but also
captures the general deterioration in the quality
of bank portfolios which is expected to result.
In addition to the value of having a synthetic
measure which aggregates in a single indicator the
simulated impacts on exposures, profitability and
capital, this approach also provides more
consistency in macroeconomic “stress” scenarios,
since it incorporates the volume effect of the
activity on exposures. This analysis is therefore
more relevant in the context of dynamic
macroeconomic scenarios.
Comparison of approaches
All of the bank results were aggregated on the basis of
the reference scenarios and the variables of interest.
At the same time, simulations of single-factor credit
shocks and macroeconomic “stress” scenarios were
carried out by the SGCB, with the goal of providing
a “benchmark” for the simulations carried out by
banks. These simulations used a "top-down"
approach, employing aggregated models, applying
the same scenarios described in Box 1.
Chart 2
Operationalisation of the “bottom-up”
and “top-down” approaches
Calibration of stress scenarios
Bank simulations 
(« bottom up »)
Impact of bank  
variables of interest
Supervisors’  
simulations 
(« top down »)
Aggregate impact  
on variables of interest
Aggregate impact  
on solvency ratio
Aggregate impact  
on variables of interest
Impact  
on solvency ratio
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6 The results are presented only as averages, because of the limited heterogeneity of individual results.
7 The net consolidated income of French banking groups accounted for nearly 1.2% of French gross domestic product in 2003.
8 For the Basel I simulations, only the effect of the “stress” event on expected losses was taken into account in the numerator (the impact on expected
earnings was not taken into account), due to the fact that the deterioration in asset quality was not taken into account in the denominator.
In the absence of a feedback effect on the real
economy, or externalities linked to a series of bank
failures (genuinely “systemic” shocks), one would
expect the aggregation of the results of individual
banks to be consistent with the results obtained using
a more macroeconomic “top-down” approach.
This consistency was in fact observed (see Box 2,
comparing the banks’ and the SGCB’s estimates).
This provides an ex post confirmation of their
robustness.
The aggregated models used to simulate the impact
of different “stress” scenarios are described in the
Appendices, distinguishing between the demand for
bank loans (Appendix 1), expected profitability
(Appendix 2) and exposures and capital
requirements (Appendix 3).
3| RESULTS OF THE SIMULATIONS
The aggregated results of the “stress” simulations
are summarised in Box 2. For each type of “stress”
scenario, results aggregated at the level of a
representative sample of the banking system are
presented, showing the net impact of the shocks:6
• on expected profitability (net of future exposures);
this impact is expressed in terms of cumulative
change at the specified time horizon (instantaneous
for the static scenarios and two years for the
macroeconomic scenarios), compared with the
situation observed at the end of 2003,7 according to
the estimates of banks and those of supervisors;
• on the solvency ratio, instantaneously for market
shocks and with a horizon of end-2005 (i.e. two years)
for the macroeconomic scenarios, measured
according to the definitions of Basel I8 and Basel II,
which also incorporate the impact of the “stress” event
on the quality of the portfolio in the denominator of
the ratio. As with profitability, this impact is expressed
in relative terms in comparison with the level
observed at the end of 2003 (see Table below).
Sample statistics at end-year 2003
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The “stress” scenarios can be classified in three broad
categories: market shocks, including liquidity
shocks; credit quality shocks; and macroeconomic
“stress” scenarios.
MARKET SHOCKS
Of the various market shocks, the scenarios involving
a flattening of the yield curve or a drop in stock
market prices (F1, F5 and F9) are the most significant
in terms of their instantaneous impact on banks. The
immediate price effect on bank portfolios of a
flattening of the yield curve is an average loss
amounting to slightly less than 4% of 2003 profits, or
less than 0.05 point in the solvency ratio. The average
solvency ratio of the banking system would decline
from 11.34% to 11.30%. The scenario of a drop in
stock market prices ratio would lead to an average
loss corresponding to roughly 21% of 2003 profits, or
0.3 point in the solvency ratio. The combination of
these two scenarios would reduce profits by 30%
relative to 2003 and lower the solvency ratio by
0.40 point. These shocks appear on the whole
relatively benign for banks, seriously threatening
neither their profitability, which would remain on
average strongly positive, nor their solvency.
Considering the substantial margin that banks
maintain above the regulatory minimum of 8%, these
results suggest that the banking system has ample
capacity to withstand these types of shocks.
With the exception of scenario F3 – a parallel
upward shift in the yield curve for all maturities
(short, medium, and long), the shock being specific
to the insurance sector – and scenario F4 – a
deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios – the64 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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Box 2
Results of “stress tests” for the French banking system
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9  An “expert system” developed by the SGCB for early detection of troubled banking institutions
market shocks have only a marginal effect on the
profitability and solvency of banks. These findings
are in line with observations in other countries that
have carried out an FSAP, and where market shocks
appear on the whole to be handled well by banks.
Finally, it should be noted that no liquidity “stress
test” was conducted, strictly speaking, to analyze
the risk of propagation of failures in the inter-bank
market (exposure channel). Indeed, current
regulations impose a strict standard in order to
constantly avert the possibility of a liquidity crisis.
The standard takes the form of the ratio of disposable
liquid assets to short-term liabilities; this ratio must
be greater than 100%. Historical statistics indicate
that this standard has been breached in the past by
only 1.4% of the institutions in the French banking
system, accounting for only 0.5% of all assets in the
French banking sector; i.e. only this very small
number of institutions have allowed their balance
of liquid assets to fall below 100% of total short-term
liabilities.
In the F3 scenario, the yield curve undergoes a
300-basis-point shift upwards. This particularly large
shock was conceived specifically to test the
resilience of the insurance sector. Portfolio securities
in this sector are generally held in very long
maturities. They have recorded significant
unrealised capital gains as a result of the decline in
interest rates over the past few years, which would
be dissipated only if there were to be a very large
upward shift in the yield curve, particularly in the
long-term segment of the curve. Assuming full
consolidation of the losses of insurance subsidiaries
at the level of the banking group, the shock would
represent approximately 36% of 2003 bank profits
and would lead to a decline of 0.34 point in the
solvency ratio. The banking system appears to be
easily capable of withstanding this extreme shock.
GENERAL DETERIORATION
IN THE QUALITY OF LOAN PORTFOLIOS
Scenario F4, a general deterioration in the quality
of loan portfolios, is intended to simulate periods of
sudden pressure on credit ratings during episodes
of flight to the highest-quality borrowers (flight to
quality). While this type of phenomenon is plausible
for securities portfolios,  its spread to loan portfolio
would appear to be an extreme case. The objective
here is rather to simulate a shock of a systemic
nature.
The “stress” was calibrated to be equivalent to a
downgrade of one level (specialists speak of one
“notch”) in the average rating of loan portfolios on
the Standard and Poor’s reference scale (with the
exception of certain sensitive sectors such as
telecommunications, transport, energy, and
commercial property, for which the shock is
equivalent to a two-level downgrade). The
calibration corresponds to an average increase of
approximately 25% in the probability of default on
a national scale. As with the other sensitivity tests,
the probability of such an event occurring is
estimated at 1%.
The instantaneous impact of this shock indicates
the percentage of claims likely to fall rapidly into
default in the event of a systemic crisis. This impact
appears to be significant, with the requirement for
new provisions representing on average (according
to bank estimates) nearly 45% of 2003 profits and
approximately 0.56 point in the solvency ratio.
This shock was also simulated by supervisors
using the SAABA expert system,9 which allows
supervisors to observe the distribution of exposures
in banks’ loan portfolios. The supervisors’ simulations
are slightly more pessimistic, with an instantaneous
impact estimated at 56% of 2003 profits and 0.72 point
in the solvency ratio.
The results of both simulations appear relatively
consistent and suggest that the impact on the
solvency ratio, while significant, is entirely bearable
for French banks.
Finally, the deterioration in credit spreads for
emerging-country counterparties, equivalent to a
two-notch rating downgrade (scenario F7), has only
a limited impact on French banks, estimated at
approximately 7% of 2003 profits and 0.10 point in
the solvency ratio.66 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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10 It should, however, be noted that the variants corresponding to “extreme” shocks, in the sense that their probability of occurring is less than 5%, do
not correspond to the usual application of macroeconomic models, that are used to measure  small deviations from a baseline. Large deviations
can produce non-linearities associated with changes in behavior. Such an exercise can nevertheless provide a first approximation of the impact of
the shocks under consideration.
MACROECONOMIC “STRESS” SCENARIOS
While dynamic macroeconomic “stress” scenarios
compensate for the weaknesses of single- and multi-
factor scenarios, they are on the other hand more
complex to analyze. In this regard, benchmarking
the “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches – the
former aggregating the results of banks’ implicit
models and the latter being based on explicit models
of transmission – has the advantage of highlighting
potential channels for transmitting a “stress” event
in the real economy to the banking system.10
Results of “bottom-up” simulations
In the “bottom-up” approach, banks simulated the
macroeconomic “stress” scenarios at a horizon of
two years using their own internal models. The
impact of the scenarios on net projected profitability
is shown in Box 2.
According to the banks’ simulations, scenario M1 – a
drop in global demand leading to zero GDP growth
in 2004 and 2005, using baseline economic
assumptions – has the greatest impact, leading to a
decline of approximately 24% in net profitability at
the 2005 horizon compared with the level observed
at the end of 2003.
Scenario M4 – depreciation of the dollar for
two years – appears to be less unfavourable with an
average decline in expected profitability of only 4.4%
in 2005 compared with the level at the end of 2003.
The scenarios involving an increase in the price of
oil, with or without a monetary policy reaction, on
the other hand, have a modest impact on expected
profitability, or even a slightly favourable impact in
the former case. An interpretation of these results
is suggested below, in the comparison with the
supervisors’ models.
The banks did not directly simulate the impact on
the solvency ratio. It was calculated by the SGCB from
the banks’ results. According to these calculations,
the impact on the solvency ratio appears significant
for the scenario of a drop in global demand, with a
one-point average decline in the solvency ratio based
on the Basel I standards  currently in force. If the
calculation is based on Basel II, the impact on the
solvency ratio exceeds two points at the 2005 horizon,
reflecting a large increase in the denominator of the
ratio due to the deterioration in exposures (see below).
Results of “top-down” simulations
The results of the “top-down” simulations were
obtained in parallel, using the methodology and the
models described above. Their simulated impact on
the net average expected profitability of the banking
system appears to be relatively in line with the
aggregate results of the banks (Chart 3).
For example, the model estimates that the scenario
of a drop in global demand and a recession in France
leads to a 26% average decline in profits from 2003
levels, as opposed to a 24% decline in the banks’
simulations. The impact is also slightly less
favourable for the foreign exchange scenario, with
a 10% decline from levels at the end of 2003 (as
opposed to 5% for the banks); and more favourable
for the oil price increase scenarios M2 and M3 (+7%
and +13% respectively as opposed to +2% and +9%
for the banks).
Chart 3
Net profitability after a shock
according to the SGCB estimations
(as a percentage)
The chart displays the change in banks’ net income in 2004 and 2005
for the different scenarios relative to net income at the end of 2003. The baseline and
the scenarios are drawn from the spread model (Appendix 2) using macroeconomic
data furnished by the Mascotte model.
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11 According to NiGEM, shocks to long-term rates are more persistent than shocks to short-term rates, so that a temporary increase in short-term
interest rates has a more durable effect on long-term rates and temporarily increases the slope of the yield curve.
Because the econometric model used in the
“top-down” approach enables changes in net income
to be linked explicitly to the economic context (risk,
slope and volatility of interest rates, volume of
credit), it is possible to confirm the economic
robustness of their results.
In the first place, as might have been expected, all
of the “stress” scenarios (except the supervisors’
scenario M3) forecast profitability at the end of 2005
to be less than the baseline forecast, which
represents the normal economic trend. The baseline
forecast, which is based on the OECD’s autumn 2003
projections of French GDP growth for 2004 and 2005,
is that bank profitability will increase by
approximately 12.5% by the 2005 horizon. The
“stress” events definitely have an unfavourable
effect: the scenario of an increase in the price of oil
leads to a smaller increase in expected profitability
(7% instead of 13% for scenario M2). Interestingly,
scenario M3, which includes a monetary reaction,
contributes to restoring bank profitability (net
income increases by 13.2% compared to 2003, as
opposed to 7% in the absence of a monetary reaction
and 12.5% for the baseline scenario). Measured
against the baseline, the impact of the scenario of a
drop in global demand appears to be even more
severe, since it reduces the net income in 2005 by
36% according to the banks’ estimates and by 38.5%
according to the SGCB.
In particular, the Mascotte model provides a better
understanding of the transmission mechanisms for
the most unfavourable scenario (M1). The drop in
global demand, leading to two years of stagnation
in economic activity in France, results in a sharp
decline in the demand for domestic credit and an
increase in the failure rate for businesses. The scissor
effect of the decline in economic activity and
revenues and the increase in risk explains the
observed contraction in earnings.
Scenario M3 assumes a reaction on the part of the
European Central Bank according to Taylor’s Rule,
with an initial increase in key rates triggered by
monetary authorities in order to contain the
inflationary pressures resulting from the increase in
the price of oil (second-round effects). The standard
reaction embedded in the NiGEM model results in
this case in an increase in the slope of the yield curve
at the end of two years, which improves banks’
performance via their transformation activity.11
Chart 4 illustrates the effects of the different
scenarios on the level of risk-weighted assets, and
consequently on capital requirements, i.e. on the
denominator, RWA, of the solvency ratio. Compared
with the baseline, which forecasts an increase in
risk-weighted assets of slightly less than 10% at the
end of 2005 due to the increase in outstanding loans,
the different scenarios lead to a general deterioration
in the quality of portfolios, resulting in an increase
in capital requirements. In the recession scenario,
the strong growth in capital requirements
(denominator) combined with the downward impact
on profitability and capital (numerator) explains the
two-point change observed in the solvency ratio,
which is by far the most unfavourable. However,
even in this case, the ratio remains above the
regulatory minimum of 8% due to the high initial
level of the solvency ratio of French banks.
The other scenarios appear to have a more modest
impact, with a maximum 15% increase in capital
requirements due to deterioration in exposures at
the two-year horizon.
Chart 4
Increase in risk-weighted assets (Basel II)
according to SGCB estimates
(as a percentage)
The chart displays relative changes in risk-weighted assets (RWA) for the
different scenarios, compared with the level at the end of 2003; these changes
would result in additional capital requirements.
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Several lessons can be drawn from this “stress test” exercise, concerning the results obtained, the
methodology used, and future work.
Concerning the results, the different “stress” scenarios applied to the French banking system, on the basis
of 2003 reports and predicted performance in 2004 and 2005, indicate French banks’ strong capacity to
withstand shocks. Among the shocks studied, zero growth in the French economy for two years as the result
of a slowdown in global demand appears to be the most severe. This shock would lead to an average 35%
reduction in bank earnings compared with the baseline forecast for the end of 2005, and a decrease of one
point (Basel I) to two points (Basel II) in the solvency ratio. The main French banking groups, which have an
average ratio close to 12%, have a sufficient margin of solvency to absorb such a shock.
Concerning the methods used, the implementation of “stress tests” is now tried and tested, given the
number of exercises already carried out at the international level and the experience acquired previously
in France. The use of the Banque de France’s macroeconomic model and the development of financial
models for measuring risk were particularly useful in ensuring the consistency of the French exercise.
Certainly, the absence of a common, standardised conceptual framework for the macro-prudential approach
made it necessary to tackle the question from a number of different angles. Nevertheless, the overall
consistency in the results obtained from the “bottom-up” approach (based on individual banks’ accounts)
and the supervisors’ “top-down” approach tends to confirm their robustness.
Concerning future work, the FSAP has served as a catalyst for the development of tools for assessing
aggregate risk. In addition to pursuing the calibration of the instruments, the next phase of work should
aim at integrating the different approaches, currently in partial equilibrium (credit market, bank capital
market, etc.), in a unified conceptual framework, while also seeking to incorporate more systematically
the international dimension of banking activity.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 69
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APPENDIX 1
Demand for credit in the private sector
Work currently in progress at the Banque de France modeling demand for credit in the private sector, as a
complement to the Mascotte model, emphasises the link between the demand for credit in the private sector,
investment demand on the part of household and businesses, and interest rates. The model presented in this
Appendix deals only with household demand for credit. Since the rapid growth in bank lending at the end of
the 1980s may have caused a change in regime, the estimate begins in 1985.
In the long term, lending is a function of consumption and investment. In addition, real interest rates have a
negative effect on the demand for credit. The near-unit elasticity of credit to inflation signifies that the
demand for credit adapts rapidly to any surprises in terms of inflation.
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Estimation period 1985: Q1 - 2001: Q4
where Lt
H represents the nominal outstanding amount of credit to households, It
H is total investment by
households (at 1995 prices), pt
H is the price of household investment (base = 1995), tx _ bondt is the yield on
long-term government securities, Ct
H is the volume of household consumption (at 1995 prices), Pt
C is the price
deflator for household consumption and DU851874 is a dummy variable for financial deregulation, with a
value of one from 1985: Q1 to 1987: Q4 and zero thereafter.
In addition, over the past 15 years, a fairly strong correlation has been observed between household demand
for credit and property prices. This leads us to introduce a variant in the previous equation in which property
prices are included in the short-term dynamic. The causality is considered here as running from property
prices to credit, although the reverse causality is also possible.
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where Pt
RE represents the index of property prices for all of France, published by INSEE. Such an equation
makes it possible for “stress” testing to generate credit forecasts consistent with the selected macroeconomic
scenarios.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 71
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APPENDIX 2
Benchmark model of profitability
The model of interest income generation in banks is the result of work carried out at the SGCB to extend the
model of profitability originally proposed by Flannery (1981), which suggests that net interest income is
partly a function of the business cycle, measured in terms of the level and volatility of interest rates and the
variation in the demand for credit; and partly a function of the composition and quality of bank portfolio,
measured respectively by inertia (the auto-regressive term) and the associated cost of risk.
The model of profitability used is a dynamic panel model calibrated for all banks using the Commission
bancaire’s BAFI (database of financial agents) data for the period 1993-2003 (4,160 bank observations x year).
The model employs the unbiased estimator of Anderson-Hsiao (1982) using a second-order lagged endogenous
variable as the instrumental variable. (See Goyau, Sauviat and Tarazi, 2002, for a similar approach, which
however employs a different econometric approach and uses data for the period 1988-1995).
Mi,t = 0,64 + 0,68 Mi,t-1 + 0,35 p 
* – 0,59 σ 
* 
2
 + 0,29 p 
*∆Li,t – 0,20 πi,t +   t (17,99) (10,19) (- 4,96) (15,34) (-0,65) t p,t t ε
adjusted R2 = 0.83
Mi,t = net interest margin of bank i at time t
pt
* = difference in riskless (credit risk) interest rates : 5 years - 3 months
σ* p,t = volatility of the slope : 5 years - 3 months
∆Li,t = nominal rate of growth in lending for bank i at time t
πi,t = cost of risk expected by bank i at time t
Student statistic in parentheses
This model was used to simulate the profitability of banks for the FSAP exercise. “Stress” scenarios constructed
with the aid of the Mascotte macroeconomic model of the Banque de France were used to simulate exogenous
changes in the factors of the spread model at a 2005 horizon, and to estimate the impact of the propagation of
shocks on bank profitability.72 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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APPENDIX 3
Model of variation in risk-weighted assets and capital requirements (Basel II)
An important development in risk analysis introduced by the Basel II reforms is the consideration of changes
in the quality of bank portfolios as a function of the business cycle. Henceforth, capital requirements will be
set as a function of the credit quality of the borrower. Credit quality is approximated by a rating, which may
be public (for example, AAA on the Standard and Poor’s rating scale) or internal to the bank. Several levels of
rating or credit quality are defined. A certain fraction x of the exposures assigned to rating grade i (i=1,…N )
in period t-1 will receive the same rating in period t. The complementary fraction (1-x) will “migrate” to
another rating grade. If one proceeds in this fashion for all rating grades, one obtains a matrix of dimension
N x N. This transition matrix represents a statistical summary of the probabilities that exposures will move or
“migrate” from one credit quality level to another between time t-1 and time t. The transition matrix is often
assumed to be invariant over time, but that is not the assumption made here. Instead, in order to model
changes in credit risk as a function of the economic outlook, the sensitivity of the transition matrix to
macroeconomic  developments is considered. Work carried out by the SGCB has attempted to show a link
between observed transition matrices and data on short-term macroeconomic variables (GDP, interest rates,
etc.). The model has been designed to link the probability of migration, for each state in the matrix, to cyclical
factors, according to a prescribed logistical law. The complete model, for i varying from 1 to N, and j varying
from 1 to N-1, is:
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where Xt is a vector of exogenous macroeconomic variables and εij an error term.
The implications of this model are then expressed in terms of regulatory capital requirements. Given an
initial portfolio and an economic context determined by the macroeconomic scenarios produced by the Mascotte
model, this model can be used to estimate a “stressed” transition matrix, which can then be applied to produce
a final “stressed” portfolio. Thus, given RWAt, the regulatory capital requirements; RW, the vector of risk
weightings according to Basel II; Zt-1 the initial loan portfolio; P (Xt) , the transition matrix, which is itself a
function of macroeconomic factors; and υt, new loans extended in time period t, the dynamic behaviour of the
portfolio can be represented as follows:
{
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In the case where the amount of new loans υt is zero;12 this reduces to:
− dRWA
t = 
RWA
t (X
t) RW' . Z
t
RWA
t (X)
−
RW' . Z (X)
=
where 
−
X refers to a given equilibrium. Thus, once the reference situation has been selected, it is possible to
evaluate the impact of a cyclical shock on regulatory capital.
12 This assumption is conservative in the sense that new loans tend to bring the bank’s average profitability back closer to its hurdle rate, unless the
bank engages in risk-prone behavior (gambling for resurrection).